%0 Report
        %A Danilov, Anastasia
%A Sliwka, Dirk
        %T Can Contracts Signal Social Norms? Experimental Evidence
        %D 2013
        %8 2013 Jun
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 7477
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp7477
        %X We investigate whether incentive schemes signal social norms and thus affect behavior beyond their direct economic consequences. A principal-agent experiment is studied in which prior to contract choice principals are informed about past actions of other agents and thus have more information about "norms of behavior". Compared to a setting with uninformed principals agents exert nearly 50% higher efforts under a fixed wage contract when an informed principal had chosen this contract. Apparently the informed principal's choice signals a norm not to exploit the trust which leads to more trustworthy behavior. This mechanism's robustness is explored in further experiments.
        %K experiments
%K signaling
%K incentives
%K contracts
%K social norms