@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp74,
            	author={Kräkel, Matthias},
            	title={Strategic Mismatches in Competing Teams},
            	year={1999},
	month={Nov},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={74},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp74},
	abstract={This paper discusses the strategic role of mismatching, where players voluntarily form inefficient teams or forego the formation of efficient teams, respectively. Strategic mismatching can be rational when players realize a competitive advantage (e.g. harming other competitors). In addition, the results show that free riding can be beneficial for a team in combination with strategic mismatching and that the loser’s curse may be welfare improving by mitigating the problem of strategic mismatching.},
	keywords={teams;Economies of scope;tournament;free-rider effect;mismatch},
            }