%0 Report
        %A Dur, Robert
%A Tichem, Jan
        %T Altruism and Relational Incentives in the Workplace
        %D 2013
        %8 2013 Apr
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 7363
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp7363
        %X This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The con- tract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find that altruism undermines the credibility of a threat of dis- missal but strengthens the credibility of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that higher altruism sometimes leads to higher bonuses, while lower altruism may increase productivity and players utility in equilibrium.
        %K Nash bargaining
%K spite
%K subjective performance evaluation
%K efficiency wages
%K incentives
%K relational contracts
%K altruism