@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp7363,
            	author={Dur, Robert and Tichem, Jan},
            	title={Altruism and Relational Incentives in the Workplace},
            	year={2013},
	month={Apr},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={7363},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp7363},
	abstract={This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The con- tract may contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and a threat of dismissal. We find that altruism undermines the credibility of a threat of dis- missal but strengthens the credibility of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that higher altruism sometimes leads to higher bonuses, while lower altruism may increase productivity and players utility in equilibrium.},
	keywords={Nash bargaining;spite;subjective performance evaluation;efficiency wages;incentives;relational contracts;altruism},
            }