TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Cockx, Bart
AU  - Ghirelli, Corinna
AU  - Linden, Bruno Van der
        TI  - Monitoring Job Search Effort with Hyperbolic Time Preferences and Non-Compliance: A Welfare Analysis
        PY  - 2013/Mar/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 7266
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp7266
        AB  - This paper develops a partial equilibrium job search model to study the behavioral and welfare implications of an Unemployment Insurance (UI) scheme in which job search requirements are imposed on UI recipients with hyperbolic preferences. We show that, if the search requirements are well chosen, a perfect monitoring scheme can in principle increase the job finding rate and, contrary to what happens with exponential discounting, it can raise the expected lifetime utility of the current and future selves of sophisticated hyperbolic discounters. The same holds for naive agents if the welfare criterion ignores their misperception problem.
In sum, introducing a perfect monitoring scheme can be a Pareto improvement. However, if claimants have the opportunity to withdraw from the UI scheme, their long-run utility can even be lower than in the absence of job search requirements. Imperfections in the measurement of job-search effort further reduce the chances that monitoring raises the welfare of the unemployed.
        KW  - job search model
KW  - job search monitoring
KW  - non-compliance
KW  - hyperbolic discounting
KW  - social efficiency
        ER  -