TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Butler, Jeffrey V.
AU  - Giuliano, Paola
AU  - Guiso, Luigi
        TI  - Trust, Values and False Consensus
        PY  - 2012/Oct/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 6916
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp6916
        AB  - Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners – i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that one's own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Mis-calibrated beliefs lower participants' experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average.
        KW  - culture
KW  - trustworthiness
KW  - trust
KW  - false consensus
        ER  -