TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Masella, Paolo
AU  - Meier, Stephan
AU  - Zahn, Philipp
        TI  - Incentives and Group Identity
        PY  - 2012/Aug/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 6815
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp6815
        AB  - This paper investigates in a principal-agent environment whether and how group membership influences the effectiveness of incentives and when incentives can have “hidden costs”, i.e., a detrimental effect. We show experimentally that in all interactions control mechanisms can have hidden costs for reasons specific to group membership. In within-group interactions control has detrimental effects because the agent does not expect to be controlled and reacts negatively when being controlled. In between-group interactions, agents perceive control more hostile once we condition on their beliefs about principal's behavior. Our finding contributes to the micro-foundation of psychological effects of incentives.
        KW  - trust
KW  - crowding out
KW  - motivation
KW  - incentives
KW  - social preferences
KW  - social identity
KW  - experiment
        ER  -