@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp6815,
            	author={Masella, Paolo and Meier, Stephan and Zahn, Philipp},
            	title={Incentives and Group Identity},
            	year={2012},
	month={Aug},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={6815},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp6815},
	abstract={This paper investigates in a principal-agent environment whether and how group membership influences the effectiveness of incentives and when incentives can have “hidden costs”, i.e., a detrimental effect. We show experimentally that in all interactions control mechanisms can have hidden costs for reasons specific to group membership. In within-group interactions control has detrimental effects because the agent does not expect to be controlled and reacts negatively when being controlled. In between-group interactions, agents perceive control more hostile once we condition on their beliefs about principal's behavior. Our finding contributes to the micro-foundation of psychological effects of incentives.},
	keywords={trust;crowding out;motivation;incentives;social preferences;social identity;experiment},
            }