%0 Report
        %A Burger, Ronelle
%A Dasgupta, Indraneel
%A Owens, Trudy
        %T A Model of NGO Regulation with an Application to Uganda
        %D 2011
        %8 2011 Dec
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 6221
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp6221
        %X We develop a model of regulation of service-delivery NGOs, where future grants are conditional on prior spending of some minimal proportion of current revenue on direct project-related expenses. Such regulation induces some NGOs to increase current project spending, but imposes wasteful costs of compliance verification on all NGOs. Under a large class of parametric configurations, we find that regulation increases total discounted project expenditure over a regime of no regulation, when verification costs constitute no more than 15% of initial revenue. We characterize the optimal regulatory policy under these configurations. We apply our analysis to a large sample of NGOs from Uganda, and find regulation to be beneficial in that context.
        %K developing countries
%K regulation of non-governmental organizations
%K Uganda