TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Conrads, Julian
AU  - Irlenbusch, Bernd
AU  - Rilke, Rainer Michael
AU  - Walkowitz, Gari
        TI  - Lying and Team Incentives
        PY  - 2011/Sep/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 5968
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp5968
        AB  - We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes.
        KW  - lying
KW  - compensation schemes
KW  - team
KW  - experiment
        ER  -