%0 Report
        %A Conrads, Julian
%A Irlenbusch, Bernd
%A Rilke, Rainer Michael
%A Walkowitz, Gari
        %T Lying and Team Incentives
        %D 2011
        %8 2011 Sep
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 5968
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp5968
        %X We investigate the influence of two widespread compensation schemes, individual piece-rates and team incentives, on participants' inclination to lie, by adapting the experimental setup of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008). Lying turns out to be more pronounced under team incentives than under individual piece-rates, which highlights a so far fairly neglected feature of these compensation schemes.
        %K lying
%K compensation schemes
%K team
%K experiment