%0 Report
        %A Cigno, Alessandro
        %T How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country
        %D 2011
        %8 2011 Apr
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 5663
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp5663
        %X As credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given that intra-family transfers, and the way a child uses her time outside school hours, are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labour below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need and merit based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.
        %K optimal taxation
%K moral hazard
%K uncertainty
%K education
%K child labour