@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp5663,
            	author={Cigno, Alessandro},
            	title={How to Deal with Covert Child Labour, and Give Children an Effective Education, in a Poor Developing Country},
            	year={2011},
	month={Apr},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={5663},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp5663},
	abstract={As credit and insurance markets are imperfect, and given that intra-family transfers, and the way a child uses her time outside school hours, are private information, the second-best policy makes school enrollment compulsory, forces overt child labour below its efficient level (if positive), and uses a combination of need and merit based grants, financed by earmarked taxes, to relax credit constraints, redistribute and insure. Existing conditional cash transfer schemes can be made to approximate the second-best policy by incorporating these principles in some measure.},
	keywords={optimal taxation;moral hazard;uncertainty;education;child labour},
            }