TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Fevang, Elisabeth
AU  - Markussen, Simen
AU  - Røed, Knut
        TI  - The Sick Pay Trap
        PY  - 2011/Apr/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 5655
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp5655
        AB  - In most countries, employers are financially responsible for sick pay during an initial period of a worker's absence spell, after which the public insurance system covers the bill. Based on a quasi-natural experiment in Norway, where pay liability was removed for pregnancy-related absences, we show that firms' absence costs significantly affect employees' absence behavior. However, by restricting pay liability to the initial period of the absence spell, firms are discouraged from letting long-term sick workers back into work, since they then face the financial risk associated with subsequent relapses. We show that this disincentive effect is statistically and economically significant.
        KW  - social insurance
KW  - experience rating
KW  - multivariate hazard rate models
KW  - absenteeism
        ER  -