TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Addison, John T.
AU  - Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin
AU  - Kuhn, Thomas
        TI  - The Dilemma of Delegating Search: Budgeting in Public Employment Services
        PY  - 2010/Sep/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 5170
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp5170
        AB  - The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates.
        KW  - matching unemployment
KW  - public employment service
KW  - delegation problem
KW  - moral hazard
KW  - search theory
        ER  -