%0 Report
        %A Addison, John T.
%A Altemeyer-Bartscher, Martin
%A Kuhn, Thomas
        %T The Dilemma of Delegating Search: Budgeting in Public Employment Services
        %D 2010
        %8 2010 Sep
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 5170
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp5170
        %X The poor performance often attributed to many public employment services may be explained in part by a delegation problem between the central office and local job centers. In markets characterized by frictions, job centers function as match-makers, linking job seekers with relevant vacancies. Because their search intensity in contacting employers and collecting data is not verifiable by the central authority, a typical moral hazard problem can arise. To overcome the delegation problem and provide high-powered incentives for high levels of search effort on the part of job centers, we propose output-related schemes that assign greater staff capacity to agencies achieving high strike rates.
        %K matching unemployment
%K public employment service
%K delegation problem
%K moral hazard
%K search theory