@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp5136,
            	author={Thisse, Jacques-François and Toulemonde, Eric},
            	title={The Distribution of Earnings under Monopsonistic/polistic Competition},
            	year={2010},
	month={Aug},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={5136},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp5136},
	abstract={Recent empirical contributions in labor economics suggest that individual firms face upward sloping labor supplies. We rationalize this by assuming that idiosyncratic non-pecuniary conditions interact with money wages in workers’ decisions to work for specific firms. Likewise, firms supply differentiated goods in response to differences in consumer tastes. Hence, firms are price-makers and wage-setters. By combining monopolistic and monopsonistic competition, our setting encapsulates general equilibrium interactions between the two markets. The equilibrium involves double exploitation of labor. Compared to the competitive outcome, the high-productive workers are overpaid under free entry, whereas the low-productive workers are underpaid. In the same vein, capital-owners receive a premium, whereas workers are exploited.},
	keywords={wage dispersion;worker heterogeneity;monopsonistic competition;monopolistic competition;labor exploitation},
            }