@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp4863,
            	author={Frederiksen, Anders},
            	title={Earnings Progression, Human Capital and Incentives: Theory and Evidence},
            	year={2010},
	month={Apr},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={4863},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp4863},
	abstract={The career prospects of newly recruited employees differ substantially within an organization. The stars experience a considerable growth in earnings; others can hardly maintain their entry salaries. This article sheds light on the mechanisms generating the observed heterogeneity in earnings progression by investigating the effects of on-the-job human capital acquisition, explicit short-run incentives and career concern incentives on earnings progression. The model leads to predictions about the incentive structure and the progression in both cross-sectional and individual earnings which are supported by the empirical analysis based on personnel records from a large bank.},
	keywords={personnel economics;explicit incentives;career concern incentives;performance;earnings dynamics},
            }