@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp4820,
            	author={Dreher, Axel and Klasen, Stephan and Vreeland, James Raymond and Werker, Eric},
            	title={The Costs of Favoritism: Is Politically-Driven Aid Less Effective?},
            	year={2010},
	month={Mar},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={4820},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp4820},
	abstract={As is now well documented, aid is given for both political as well as economic reasons. The conventional wisdom is that politically-motivated aid is less effective in promoting developmental objectives. We examine the ex-post performance ratings of World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated – such as those granted to governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank – are no more likely, on average, to get a negative quality rating than other projects. When aid is given to Security Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World Bank project quality suffers as a consequence of political influence only when the recipient country is economically vulnerable in the first place.},
	keywords={United Nations Security Council;political influence;aid effectiveness;World Bank},
            }