%0 Report
        %A Ockenfels, Axel
%A Sliwka, Dirk
%A Werner, Peter
        %T Bonus Payments and Reference Point Violations
        %D 2010
        %8 2010 Feb
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 4795
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp4795
        %X We investigate how bonus payments affect satisfaction and performance of managers in a large, multinational company. We find that falling behind a naturally occurring reference point for bonus comparisons reduces satisfaction and subsequent performance. The effects tend to be mitigated if information about one's relative standing towards the reference point is withheld.
        %K job performance
%K job satisfaction
%K bonus payments
%K incentives
%K reference points