TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Dur, Robert
AU  - Non, Arjan
AU  - Roelfsema, Hein
        TI  - Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
        PY  - 2010/Feb/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 4782
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp4782
        AB  - We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to
receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.

        KW  - double moral hazard
KW  - GSOEP
KW  - social exchange
KW  - reciprocity
KW  - incentive contracts
        ER  -