%0 Report
        %A Dur, Robert
%A Non, Arjan
%A Roelfsema, Hein
        %T Reciprocity and Incentive Pay in the Workplace
        %D 2010
        %8 2010 Feb
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 4782
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp4782
        %X We study optimal incentive contracts for workers who are reciprocal to management attention. When neither worker's effort nor manager's attention can be contracted, a double moral-hazard problem arises, implying that reciprocal workers should be given weak financial incentives. In a multiple-agent setting, this problem can be resolved using promotion incentives. We empirically examine these predictions using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. We find that workers who are more reciprocal are significantly more likely to
receive promotion incentives, while there is no such relation for individual bonus pay.

        %K double moral hazard
%K GSOEP
%K social exchange
%K reciprocity
%K incentive contracts