@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp4603,
            	author={Chiappori, Pierre-André and Donni, Olivier},
            	title={Non-unitary Models of Household Behavior: A Survey of the Literature},
            	year={2009},
	month={Nov},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={4603},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp4603},
	abstract={This article considers non-unitary models of household behavior. These models suppose explicitly that households consist of a number of different members with preferences that are different from each other. They can be split up into two principal categories: cooperative (or collective) models, in which the allocations are supposed to be Pareto efficient; and non-cooperative (or strategic) models which are based on the concept of Cournot-Nash equilibrium. The demand functions that describe household behavior in these models are subject to constraints that differ from the traditional Slutsky conditions. In addition, in a certain number of specific cases, the preferences of the different household members can be identified from observable behavior.},
	keywords={testability;strategic model;collective model;households;identification},
            }