TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Acemoglu, Daron
AU  - Ticchi, Davide
AU  - Vindigni, Andrea
        TI  - Persistence of Civil Wars
        PY  - 2009/Sep/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 4418
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp4418
        AB  - A notable feature of post-World War II civil wars is their very long average duration. We provide a theory of the persistence of civil wars. The civilian government can successfully defeat rebellious factions only by creating a relatively strong army. In weakly-institutionalized polities this opens the way for excessive influence or coups by the military. Civilian governments whose rents are largely unaffected by civil wars then choose small and weak armies that are incapable of ending insurrections. Our framework also shows that when civilian governments need to take more decisive action against rebels, they may be forced to build over-sized armies, beyond the size necessary for fighting the insurrection, as a commitment to not reforming the military in the future.
        KW  - political transitions
KW  - military
KW  - coups
KW  - commitment
KW  - civil wars
KW  - political economy
        ER  -