%0 Report
        %A Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos
%A Menzio, Guido
%A Smith, Eric
        %T Job Search with Bidder Memories
        %D 2009
        %8 2009 Jul
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 4319
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp4319
        %X This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.
        %K wage determination
%K recall
%K job search
%K Diamond paradox