@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp4319,
            	author={Carrillo-Tudela, Carlos and Menzio, Guido and Smith, Eric},
            	title={Job Search with Bidder Memories},
            	year={2009},
	month={Jul},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={4319},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp4319},
	abstract={This paper revisits the no-recall assumption in job search models with take-it-or-leave-it offers. Workers who can recall previously encountered potential employers in order to engage them in Bertrand bidding have a distinct advantage over workers without such attachments. Firms account for this difference when hiring a worker. When a worker first meets a firm, the firm offers the worker a sufficient share of the match rents to avoid a bidding war in the future. The pair share the gains to trade. In this case, the Diamond paradox no longer holds.},
	keywords={wage determination;recall;job search;Diamond paradox},
            }