TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Hairault, Jean-Olivier
AU  - Langot, François
AU  - Ménard, Sébastien
AU  - Sopraseuth, Thepthida
        TI  - Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers
        PY  - 2009/Mar/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 4071
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp4071
        AB  - This paper shows that optimal unemployment insurance contracts are age-dependent. Older workers have only a few years left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However, there is a sufficiently short distance to retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract as the nearly retired unemployed workers rationally expect never to suffer from the punishment. This is why imposing a tax on the future job is particularly efficient in the context of older workers because the agency can now reward the job search by present employment subsidies. Moreover, we propose adopting a global approach to unemployment insurance by determining an optimal contract that integrates unemployment insurance and retirement pension systems.
        KW  - recursive contracts
KW  - retirement
KW  - unemployment insurance
KW  - moral hazard
        ER  -