TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Beissinger, Thomas
AU  - Egger, Hartmut
        TI  - Dynamic Wage Bargaining if Benefits are Tied to Individual Wages
        PY  - 2001/Nov/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 389
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp389
        AB  - In dynamic wage bargaining models it is usually assumed that individual unemployment benefits are a fraction of the average wage level. In most countries, however, unemployment benefits are instead tied to the previous level of individually earned wages. We show how the analysis has to be modified if this fact is taken into account and compare our findings for the wage-setting curve with outcomes under other unemployment compensation schemes. In particular, we show that the widely used vertical wage-setting curve relies on more restrictive assumptions than usually considered. We also demonstrate that a reduction of unemploy-ment benefits of those who get unemployed after the bargaining period leads to higher equilibrium unemployment.
        KW  - unemployment benefits
KW  - Dynamic wage bargaining
KW  - wage curve
        ER  -