TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Kaas, Leo
AU  - Madden, Paul
        TI  - Minimum Wages and Welfare in a Hotelling Duopsony
        PY  - 2008/Apr/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 3434
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp3434
        AB  - Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed; the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are studied under laissez-faire and under a minimum wage regime. Up to a restriction for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, the imposition of a minimum wage is always welfare-improving because of its effect on non-wage job characteristics.
        KW  - minimum wages
KW  - hotelling
KW  - duopsony
        ER  -