%0 Report
        %A Kaas, Leo
%A Madden, Paul
        %T Minimum Wages and Welfare in a Hotelling Duopsony
        %D 2008
        %8 2008 Apr
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 3434
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp3434
        %X Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed; the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are studied under laissez-faire and under a minimum wage regime. Up to a restriction for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, the imposition of a minimum wage is always welfare-improving because of its effect on non-wage job characteristics.
        %K minimum wages
%K hotelling
%K duopsony