@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp3434,
            	author={Kaas, Leo and Madden, Paul},
            	title={Minimum Wages and Welfare in a Hotelling Duopsony},
            	year={2008},
	month={Apr},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={3434},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp3434},
	abstract={Two firms choose locations (non-wage job characteristics) on the interval [0,1] prior to announcing wages at which they employ workers who are uniformly distributed; the (constant) marginal revenue products of workers may differ. Subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage location-wage game are studied under laissez-faire and under a minimum wage regime. Up to a restriction for the existence of pure strategy equilibria, the imposition of a minimum wage is always welfare-improving because of its effect on non-wage job characteristics.},
	keywords={minimum wages;hotelling;duopsony},
            }