TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Gagliarducci, Stefano
AU  - Nannicini, Tommaso
AU  - Naticchioni, Paolo
        TI  - Electoral Rules and Politicians’ Behavior: A Micro Test
        PY  - 2008/Feb/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 3348
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp3348
        AB  - Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted redistribution and lower politicians’ rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using micro data for the mixed-member Italian House of Representatives, which allow us to sidestep the identification problems of previous studies based on country-level data. In particular, we address the nonrandom selection into different electoral systems by exploiting a distinctive feature of the Italian two-tier elections from 1994 to 2006: candidates could run for both the majoritarian and the proportional tier, but if they won in both tiers they had to accept the majoritarian seat. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi-experimental estimates of the impact of the electoral rule. The main results confirm theoretical predictions, as majoritarian representatives put forward a higher proportion of bills targeted at local areas and show lower absenteeism rates than their proportional colleagues.
        KW  - electoral rule
KW  - rent-seeking
KW  - treatment effect
KW  - regression discontinuity design
KW  - targeted redistribution
KW  - politicians
        ER  -