%0 Report
        %A Gagliarducci, Stefano
%A Nannicini, Tommaso
%A Naticchioni, Paolo
        %T Electoral Rules and Politicians’ Behavior: A Micro Test
        %D 2008
        %8 2008 Feb
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 3348
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp3348
        %X Theory predicts that the majoritarian electoral system should produce more targeted redistribution and lower politicians’ rents than proportional representation. We test these predictions using micro data for the mixed-member Italian House of Representatives, which allow us to sidestep the identification problems of previous studies based on country-level data. In particular, we address the nonrandom selection into different electoral systems by exploiting a distinctive feature of the Italian two-tier elections from 1994 to 2006: candidates could run for both the majoritarian and the proportional tier, but if they won in both tiers they had to accept the majoritarian seat. Focusing on elections decided by a narrow margin allows us to generate quasi-experimental estimates of the impact of the electoral rule. The main results confirm theoretical predictions, as majoritarian representatives put forward a higher proportion of bills targeted at local areas and show lower absenteeism rates than their proportional colleagues.
        %K electoral rule
%K rent-seeking
%K treatment effect
%K regression discontinuity design
%K targeted redistribution
%K politicians