TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Koch, Alexander K.
AU  - Peyrache, Eloic
        TI  - Moral Hazard Contracts: Does One Size Fit All?
        PY  - 2006/Nov/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 2463
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp2463
        AB  - Incentive theory predicts that contract terms should respond to differences in agents’ productivities. Firms’ practice of anonymous contracts thus appears puzzling. We show that such a “one-size-fits-all” approach can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent transitions between employers, and agents have career concerns because complete long-term contracts are not feasible.
        KW  - career concerns
KW  - incentive contracts
KW  - reputation
KW  - anonymous contracts
        ER  -