@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp2463,
            	author={Koch, Alexander K. and Peyrache, Eloic},
            	title={Moral Hazard Contracts: Does One Size Fit All?},
            	year={2006},
	month={Nov},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={2463},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp2463},
	abstract={Incentive theory predicts that contract terms should respond to differences in agents’ productivities. Firms’ practice of anonymous contracts thus appears puzzling. We show that such a “one-size-fits-all” approach can be reconciled with standard agency theory if careers are marked by frequent transitions between employers, and agents have career concerns because complete long-term contracts are not feasible.},
	keywords={career concerns;incentive contracts;reputation;anonymous contracts},
            }