TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Jong, Philip de
AU  - Lindeboom, Maarten
AU  - Klaauw, Bas van der
        TI  - Screening Disability Insurance Applications
        PY  - 2006/Feb/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 1981
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp1981
        AB  - This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.
        KW  - sickness absenteeism
KW  - self-screening
KW  - policy evaluation
KW  - experiment
KW  - disability insurance
        ER  -