%0 Report
        %A Jong, Philip de
%A Lindeboom, Maarten
%A Klaauw, Bas van der
        %T Screening Disability Insurance Applications
        %D 2006
        %8 2006 Feb
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 1981
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp1981
        %X This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.
        %K sickness absenteeism
%K self-screening
%K policy evaluation
%K experiment
%K disability insurance