@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp1981,
            	author={Jong, Philip de and Lindeboom, Maarten and Klaauw, Bas van der},
            	title={Screening Disability Insurance Applications},
            	year={2006},
	month={Feb},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={1981},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp1981},
	abstract={This paper investigates the effects of intensified screening of disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was setup where in 2 of the 26 Dutch regions case workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to screen applications more intense. The empirical results show that intense screening reduces long-term sickness absenteeism and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-screening by potential disability insurance applicants. We do not find any spillover effects to the inflow into unemployment insurance. A cost-benefit analysis shows that the costs of the intensified screening are only a small fraction of its benefits.},
	keywords={sickness absenteeism;self-screening;policy evaluation;experiment;disability insurance},
            }