TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Cowgill, Bo
AU  - Freiberg, Brandon
AU  - Starr, Evan
        TI  - Clause and Effect: Theory and Field Experimental Evidence on Noncompete Clauses
        PY  - 2026/Jul/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 18820
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp18820
        AB  - We study worker noncompete clauses in a large field experiment with two finance firms. Across ~14,000 job offers to freelance recruiters on short-term contracts, we randomize wages and the presence, salience, and duration of noncompetes (all contracts also included a nondisclosure agreement). Removing a noncompete increases mobility between competing employers by 36--52% and raises workers' total earnings from the two firms by 12--17%. We find no evidence---rejecting even small effects---that removing noncompetes generates secret leakage. We also find no evidence that workers choose noncompete jobs for higher pay. Many workers appear unaware of noncompetes before firms' post-employment communication. The results align with a model of inattention and uncertainty about enforcement.
        KW  - noncompete clauses
KW  - earnings
KW  - knowledge diffusion
KW  - mobility
KW  - contracting
KW  - inattention
KW  - enforcement risk
        ER  -