%0 Report
        %A Cowgill, Bo
%A Freiberg, Brandon
%A Starr, Evan
        %T Clause and Effect: Theory and Field Experimental Evidence on Noncompete Clauses
        %D 2026
        %8 2026 Jul
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 18820
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp18820
        %X We study worker noncompete clauses in a large field experiment with two finance firms. Across ~14,000 job offers to freelance recruiters on short-term contracts, we randomize wages and the presence, salience, and duration of noncompetes (all contracts also included a nondisclosure agreement). Removing a noncompete increases mobility between competing employers by 36--52% and raises workers' total earnings from the two firms by 12--17%. We find no evidence---rejecting even small effects---that removing noncompetes generates secret leakage. We also find no evidence that workers choose noncompete jobs for higher pay. Many workers appear unaware of noncompetes before firms' post-employment communication. The results align with a model of inattention and uncertainty about enforcement.
        %K noncompete clauses
%K earnings
%K knowledge diffusion
%K mobility
%K contracting
%K inattention
%K enforcement risk