@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp18820,
            	author={Cowgill, Bo and Freiberg, Brandon and Starr, Evan},
            	title={Clause and Effect: Theory and Field Experimental Evidence on Noncompete Clauses},
            	year={2026},
	month={Jul},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={18820},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp18820},
	abstract={We study worker noncompete clauses in a large field experiment with two finance firms. Across ~14,000 job offers to freelance recruiters on short-term contracts, we randomize wages and the presence, salience, and duration of noncompetes (all contracts also included a nondisclosure agreement). Removing a noncompete increases mobility between competing employers by 36--52% and raises workers' total earnings from the two firms by 12--17%. We find no evidence---rejecting even small effects---that removing noncompetes generates secret leakage. We also find no evidence that workers choose noncompete jobs for higher pay. Many workers appear unaware of noncompetes before firms' post-employment communication. The results align with a model of inattention and uncertainty about enforcement.},
	keywords={noncompete clauses;earnings;knowledge diffusion;mobility;contracting;inattention;enforcement risk},
            }