@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp18660,
            	author={Atz, Ulrich and Eliason, Blake and Lipsitz, Michael and Norlander, Peter and Pinto, Sérgio and Steinbaum, Marshall},
            	title={The Balance of Power in Franchising},
            	year={2026},
	month={May},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={18660},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp18660},
	abstract={We measure how the contractual balance of power between franchisors and franchisees has shifted over 2009-2024 by analyzing a large corpus of Franchise Disclosure Documents and surveying over 300 franchisees. Coding more than 20 provisions across 4,500 chains, we find that franchisee autonomy declined systematically: exclusive territories fell from a majority of chains to around 20\%, while restrictions on pricing, sourcing, product offerings, and post-term competition each rose to near-universal prevalence. Franchisees appear not to have been compensated for this loss of autonomy: franchise fees rose with franchisor control, chain growth did not increase, and complaint rates to the Federal Trade Commission did not decline. We additionally find that chains that adopt franchisor-favoring provisions became 2-5 percentage points more likely to be acquired by private equity within five years. We interpret this finding as one plausible explanation for reductions in franchisee autonomy.},
	keywords={vertical restraints;franchising;text analysis;survey},
            }