TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Nishijima, Marislei
AU  - Pal, Sarmistha
        TI  - Green Mandates and the Politics in the Jungle:  Do Leftist Mayors Curb Amazon Deforestation?
        PY  - 2026/May/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 18659
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp18659
        AB  - This paper investigates whether left-leaning politicians are more effective than their right-leaning counterparts in reducing deforestation in the Legal Amazon in Brazil. Using data from 760 Amazon municipalities and a regression discontinuity approach based on close elections, it finds that leftist mayors tend to increase environmental spending always and may reduce deforestation, though the latter effect are uneven and do not extend to reforestation outcomes. Their impact is stronger in contexts with fewer coalition constraints, greater fiscal autonomy, and certain geographic or political conditions. While electoral dynamics often bring environmentally focused candidates to power in high-risk areas, structural and economic pressures limit mayoral ability to achieve sustained reductions in forest loss. Overall, the findings highlight both the potential and the constraints of decentralised governance in advancing environmental protection and carry implications for subnational environmental policy not only in Brazil, but also beyond its border.
        KW  - political ideology
KW  - leftist mayors
KW  - deforestation
KW  - reforestation
KW  - close elections
KW  - regression discontinuity design
KW  - local democracy
KW  - Brazil
        ER  -