@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp18482,
            	author={Bellue, Suzanne and Doepke, Matthias and Tertilt, Michèle},
            	title={Private Information in the Family},
            	year={2026},
	month={Mar},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={18482},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp18482},
	abstract={Standard models of the family assume that spouses share information. In this paper, we challenge this assumption with theory and evidence. We field a new survey module in the Dutch LISS panel where spouses independently report their knowledge of each other's finances. Private information is pervasive: in 40 percent of couples, at least one partner lacks full knowledge of the other's income. We examine the implications of private information for intrahousehold risk sharing using a mechanism design approach. Our model predicts that a spouse's consumption share rises with their income share when information frictions are present but is independent of income under full information. Constrained-efficient allocations can be sustained without full revelation: each spouse chooses how much money to bring home, and hidden income is never revealed. Evidence from the LISS panel confirms the predictions: a positive relationship between income and consumption shares appears only among imperfectly informed couples. Controlling for limited commitment does not affect this result, suggesting that information asymmetries-rather than commitment frictions-drive departures from full insurance.},
	keywords={family economics;marital bargaining;gender;private information;asymmetric information},
            }