TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Grund, Christian
AU  - Monschau, Philipp
        TI  - Facing Inflated Rules – Experimental Evidence from Threshold Public Goods Games
        PY  - 2025/Aug/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 18075
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp18075
        AB  - We study the role of purpose-based rules for behavior and outcomes in a threshold public good game. Rules can be sufficient or even inflated in terms of proposing a fulfilling behavior. We conduct a lab experiment to describe the implications caused by the inflation of a rule. Our study shows that inflated rules are obeyed less. Yet, rule-following occurs also with inflated rules which leads to lower efficiency regarding exactly providing the threshold. A fair share option can help to coordinate efficiently. We complement our analysis by the investigation of the role of the implemented rules for the ex-post optimal behavior, i.e. evaluating the individual contribution depending on the individual payoff.
        KW  - thresholds
KW  - groups
KW  - cooperation
KW  - coordination
KW  - rule-following
KW  - public goods
        ER  -