@TechReport{iza:izadps:dp18075,
            	author={Grund, Christian and Monschau, Philipp},
            	title={Facing Inflated Rules – Experimental Evidence from Threshold Public Goods Games},
            	year={2025},
	month={Aug},
            	institution={Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)},
            	address={Bonn},
            	type={IZA Discussion Paper},
            	number={18075},
            	url={https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp18075},
	abstract={We study the role of purpose-based rules for behavior and outcomes in a threshold public good game. Rules can be sufficient or even inflated in terms of proposing a fulfilling behavior. We conduct a lab experiment to describe the implications caused by the inflation of a rule. Our study shows that inflated rules are obeyed less. Yet, rule-following occurs also with inflated rules which leads to lower efficiency regarding exactly providing the threshold. A fair share option can help to coordinate efficiently. We complement our analysis by the investigation of the role of the implemented rules for the ex-post optimal behavior, i.e. evaluating the individual contribution depending on the individual payoff.},
	keywords={thresholds;groups;cooperation;coordination;rule-following;public goods},
            }