%0 Report
        %A Greaves, Ellen
%A Turon, Hélène
        %T School Choice and Neighborhood Sorting: Equilibrium Consequences of Geographic School Admissions
        %D 2024
        %8 2024 Feb
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 16805
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp16805
        %X Geographic school admissions criteria bind residential and school choices for some parents, and could create externalities in equilibrium for non-parents through displacement or higher rent. Through a dynamic structural model, we show that the policy decision of geographic versus non-geographic school admissions criteria has important implications for equilibrium outcomes in school and housing markets. Geographic admissions criteria segregate schools, but integrate neighborhoods according to income. Incorporating non-parents into the model challenges the existing understanding of how public schools affect the housing market: non-parent households dampen the equilibrium price premium around popular schools; non-parent households are never better off under geographic admissions.
        %K school choice
%K residential choice
%K school admissions criteria