%0 Report
        %A Köllő, János
%A Boza, István
%A Ilyés, Virág
%A Kőműves, Zsófia
%A Mark, Lili Katalin
        %T How Do Firms Deal with the Risks of Employing Ex-prisoners?
        %D 2023
        %8 2023 Dec
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 16645
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp16645
        %X We use linked employer-employee data to investigate a large sample of past and future prisoners in Hungary, 2003-2011. We first compare their jobs, focusing on attributes that can reduce the penalty the employer must pay for a mistaken hiring decision. Second, we study if employers insure themselves by paying lower wages to ex-prisoners. Third, we analyze whether the probability of the match dissolving within a few months is lower if the firm could potentially base its hiring decision on referrals. The composition of former prisoners' employment is biased toward easy-to-cancel jobs. In the unskilled jobs held by most of them, they do not earn less than future convicts, but a minority in white-collar positions are paid significantly less. Ex-prisoners' jobs are less likely to dissolve quickly if the hiring firm potentially had access to co-worker, employer, or labor office referrals.
        %K incarceration
%K reintegration
%K mobility
%K discrimination
%K Hungary