TY  - RPRT
        AU  - Hackmann, Martin B.
AU  - Pohl, Vincent
AU  - Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
        TI  - Patient versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care
        PY  - 2023/May/
        PB  - Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        CY  - Bonn
        T2  - IZA Discussion Paper
        IS  - 16165
        UR  - https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp16165
        AB  - How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551 thousand nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. 
Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost-sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.

        KW  - cost-sharing
KW  - provider incentives
KW  - patient incentives
KW  - nursing homes
KW  - long-term care
KW  - episode-based reimbursement
KW  - Medicaid
        ER  -