%0 Report
        %A Hackmann, Martin B.
%A Pohl, Vincent
%A Ziebarth, Nicolas R.
        %T Patient versus Provider Incentives in Long-Term Care
        %D 2023
        %8 2023 May
        %I Institute of Labor Economics (IZA)
        %C Bonn
        %7 IZA Discussion Paper
        %N 16165
        %U https://www.iza.org/index.php/publications/dp16165
        %X How do patient and provider incentives affect the provision of long-term care? Our analysis of 551 thousand nursing home stays yields three main insights. First, Medicaid-covered residents prolong their stays instead of transitioning to community-based care due to limited cost-sharing. Second, when facility capacity binds, nursing homes shorten Medicaid stays to admit more profitable out-of-pocket private payers. Third, providers react more elastically to financial incentives than patients. 
Thus, targeting provider incentives through alternative payment models, such as episode-based reimbursement, is more effective than increasing patient cost-sharing in facilitating transitions to community-based care and generating long-term care savings.

        %K cost-sharing
%K provider incentives
%K patient incentives
%K nursing homes
%K long-term care
%K episode-based reimbursement
%K Medicaid